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Introduction 
At the centre of South Africa's public life, the major political actors engage with each other. 
Now they conflict, now they compromise; now they call off "the talks" now they agree to 
resume discussions. The spotlight has fallen in turn on the procedure by which to arrive at 
a new constitution, the conditions for the release of the remaining political prisoners, and l 1 
the future of the African National Congress's army Umkhonto weSizwe. 
In the peri-urban and rural areas, where the majority of black South Africans live, not 
much has changed for the better, materially, since the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990 
and the unbanning of the ANC. The drought has worsened, but it is not as severe as in 
neighbouring Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and it has started to break on the eastern 
seaboard. The cost of living continues to go up, but commodities are available in the trading 
stores. There is more fear and less physical security in terms of both the political and non- 
political violence. More refugees arrive, both from the formal urban townships, and from 
over the borders; people seek a place to hide, and to be safe, and the refuge that they find is 
often at the literal expense of local residents. 
For people in these areas there is little sign, as yet, of the things that would make a material 
improvement - redistribution of land, with accompanying agricultural extension for small 
farmers, the creation of new employment opportunities, a viable school system. However, at 
a level below the central political meetings there is another set of negotiations going on 
which is important to all South Africans, and especially to those in the countryside. In 
these less public negotiations, various interest groups are struggling to define and come to 
agreement on the economic policy questions - what kind of balance between growth and 
redistribution, between central planning and the market, between privatization and public 
provision of services, will advantage which groups, in which ways? The outcome of these 
meetings will, over time. be an important influence on the opportunities for living, and 
quality of life, of the presently marginalized masses. 
The redistribution which has to take place is both racial and spatial. The inequality in 
South African society is centrally to do with the enormous differences between black and 
white in terms of political power, economic affluence, and social access. It is also to do with 
the gap between the rural and urban areas; or more accurately, perhaps, between the formal 
urban space on the one hand, and the informally built urban periphery ("the squatter 
settlements") along with true rural space on the other. 
One thing that has been getting to the countryside in the last decade or so is activities to do 
with "development", in the form of a variety of governmental and non-governmental 
initiatives. Ministries of development, community-based, secular and religious 
organizations, development projects financed by overseas aid, university-based research 
and action projects have proliferated. Their orientations differ considerably. They may 
concentrate on different sectors, such as primary health care, agricultural extension, or 
basic education and literacy. Within the sectors, there are contesting principles or 
approaches: some may concentrate more on the delivery of alternative technology, others 
on employment creation, and yet others on community organization and empowerment. 
There is no consensus between these agencies about what development really is. However, 
it is easy to find consensus among those doing "development" on what they do not stand 
for: they are not about charity, or giving handouts, or creating dependency, or applying 
band aids, or patching things up. So, the poor are not given "relief'. 
What those doing "development" do stand for are principles such as selfhelp, participation, 
empowerment, increasing organizational capacity, and so on. However, the track record of 
actual material delivery of those with a development approach is not good - in this way, 
South Africa is no exception to the international case. A growing literature chronicles the 
common shortcomings. Projects and programmes are too small, and are not replicable, 
which makes them expensive; typically they are too dependent on outside leadership and 
organizational ability,-and therefore are not self-sustaining; they frequently work to the 
objective disadvantage of women; and they do not succeed in reaching the really poor. 
They do not take on local relationships of power and dominance, and they themselves, or 
their benefits, are able to be co-opted by local elites. So, not much changes at the local level, 
and there is little "development" for the poor. 
Does this dichotomy between relief and development hold water, as it were, in the real 
world? Duffield argues that, especially in Africa, social transformations have taken place 
which have led to such vulnerability that the contrast between relief and development is 
now permanently out of place: 
The existence of 'developmentalism' within NGOs, especially the view that relief work 
is somehow secondary to development goals, tends to work against a proper 
appreciation of the full significance and historic weight of present developments ... the 
NGO relief/development debate, which casts emergencies as temporary diversions 
from the sure path of development. although having possible relevance in the 1960s 
and 1970s. has now become meaningless. (Duffield 1992: 148) 
Dreze and Sen (1 991, 1992) in discussing approaches to famine prevention, say that the 
alleged dilemma between relief and development is exaggerated. Life in the under-developed 
world has increasingly come to be characterized by precarious living conditions and lack of 
security. These authors seek a way out of the dilemma through looking at different 
approaches in economic policy to the notion of security - "growth-mediated security" and 
"support-led security": 
One approach is to promote economic growth and take the best possible advantage of 
the potentialities released by greater general affluence, including not only an 
expansion of private incomes but also an improved basis for public support. This may 
be called the strategy of 'growth-mediated security'. Another alternative is to resort 
directly to wide-ranging public support in domains such as employment provision. 
income redistribution, health-care education and social assistance in order to remove 
destitution without waiting for a transformation in the general level of affluence. 
Here success may have to be based on-a discriminating use of national resources, the 
efficiency of public services, and a redistributive bias in their delivery. This may be 
called the strategy of 'support-led security'. (Dreze and Sen. 1992: 183) 
What is the evidence for the relative success of each approach? Dreze and Sen look for it in 
the economic policies behind the performance of the ten countries in the world which have 
had the most success in reducing the under-five mortality rate (U5MR). The ten best 
performers can be divided into two distinct groups - growth-mediated and support-led. The 
latter managed to achieve much lower mortality rates than other countries at a comparable 
income level: 
. . . all these countries have repeatedly attracted attention for their active public 
involvement in various forms of social support, including the direct provision of vital 
commodities and social services ... The evidence in favour of support-led security is 
quite substantial ... (These countries) have not waited to grow rich before providing 
large-scale public support to guarantee certain basic capabilities. (Dreze and Sen. 
1992: 187-8) 
They use South Africa as an example of a particularly poor performer: with nearly six times 
the GNP per head of China and Sri Lanka, South Mica has a life expectancy approximately 
fifteen years less than those two countries. 
A point of departure for this paper is that a review is needed, in South Africa, of the 
distinction between relief and development, in the same way as it is coming up for review in 
development thinking in other countries. The different approaches to poverty alleviation 
and to redistribution need to be assessed in terms of their outcomes for the poor. The 
driving idea behind the paper is that South Africa has created, unintentionally, and 
without it being an explicit social policy, a social security system which both now and in 
future can be one vehicle for reaching the poor. I start by describing what the present 
system is, and how much it costs. I then outline some of the problematic aspects of the 
system as it now is. Following that, I consider some of the positive aspects of the system, in 
terms of the benefits it actually provides. 
I will be assessing the potential of the South African social security system in terms of 
Midgley's criterion: 
While social security cannot be regarded as the primary means by which the 
developing countries raise the levels of living of their peoples, it should contribute 
towards this objective and be compatible with broader developinent goals. (Midgley 
1984: 189) 
There is a plea embedded in the argument, that social security should not be viewed 
through the pedantic, rigid lenses of conventional economists who will decide beforehand 
that pensions are "unaffordable", "will create dependency on the state", and such like. I try 
and look at  what the system actually does in rural areas, in domestic economies; this 
should be set against the record of development economists in getting to rural people what 
they need most - the ability to command more resources. 
The Social Security System 
Social security in South Africa is one part of the broader system of welfare provision which 
is based on what Mishra ( 198 1) would call a residual system, and Korpi (1 983) would call a 
marginal system - the state will provide services and benefits if the individual, family and 
community are not able to do so.1 While welfare provision has traditionally been a 
partnership between the public and private sectors, the latter has been firmly regulated by 
the government's subsidization and standard-setting procedures. The government has used 
the subsidization and regulation procedures to protect and advantage the white population, 
particularly those in relatively poorer circumstances. 
The Department of Welfare (later Welfare and Pensions) was established in 1937 to serve all 
races, although it concentrated on urban white welfare. The Nationalist government came 
to power in 1948, and by the end of the 1950s, separate departments to serve different races 
had been established. This fragmentation was taken further with the establishment of the 
"self-governing areas" (Gazankulu, KaNgwane. KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa and QwaQwa) 
and the "independent states" (Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and Venda; these ten 
administrations will hereinafter be referred to a s  the bantustans), which each created a 
department of welfare. 
This led to the position at present where there are seventeen state departments of welfare, 
co-ordinated by three others. Welfare for coloured, Indian and white people is delivered as 
an "own affair" through the parliamentary houses of Representatives, Delegates and 
Assembly respectively. Welfare for black people in the common area of South Africa goes 
through the four provincial administrations (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal), 
and there are the ten departments in the bantustans (for further details of the history and 
complexities of the welfare structures, see Lund, 1992b). 
The racial inequality in the welfare system has been pervasive throughout: in differential 
salaries of social workers (white men earned most, black women least); in the level of 
subsidies paid to institutions such as homes for the frail aged (for example, 199 1 figures for 
the monthly subsidization of the frail aged in institutional care were R1000 for white and 
R100 for African people); in facilities at training institutions; and - germane to this paper - 
in the types and levels of social security benefits available. 
Parallel to this development of a racially separate welfare system was the development of 
the social security system. Very briefly, at Union in 1910, a pensions office was created 
which fell under the Treasury, and its main role was (as so often in countries under 
colonialism) to deal with the administration of colonial pensions (Midgley, 1984). In the 
1920s state old age pensions were introduced for white people, followed by disability grants 
in 1946. Provision was soon extended to coloured and Indian people, and thereafter to 
urban Africans, and lastly to rural Africans. 
What comprises the scheme at present? In the field of state social pensions.2 there are four 
major categories of benefits: those associated with old age, disability, child and family care, 
and poor relief. The most important pensions for the elderly are the Old Age Pension (OAP) 
and the War Veterans Pension, with a few other minor grants. In the field of the disabled 
are the Disability Grant (DG), the Blind Persons Grant and the Leprosy Grant. There are a 
number of benefits in the area of child and family care, to do with maintenance of children 
by partners who have gone away, foster care, and an allowance to people who look after 
children who would otherwise be committed to institutional care. 
The OAPs and DGs are the most significant of this cluster of social benefits in terms of 
numbers of beneficiaries and amounts paid (Lund, 1992b); I focus here on the OAP almost 
exclusively. It is a statutory right for all South Africans, so long as the qualifying rules are 
met. Gruat (1990), in his survey of African social security systems, cites only two countries 
where old age social security coverage is extended to all residents in this way - South Africa 
I 
l and Mauritius. Second, it is a non-contributory benefit, as opposed to being based on a 
social insurance principle. Beneficiaries do not contribute through their lifetime, and the i money for the benefit comes out of general revenue. L .  
~ The system is based on means-testing. In other words, it is not a universal benefit as is the 
child benefit in the United Kingdom, where all get it regardless of income. Rather, applicants 
for benefits have to prove that they have less than a certain level of income and assets in 
l 
order to qualm, and a sliding scale is applied to determine how much of the full amount of 
the grant an individual will actually get. 
The OAP is payable to women at 60 and men at 65 years old, which is in line with many 
countries, though there is an international move towards equalizing the ages for both 
I sexes, and, in some developing countries, to paying the pension earlier (in line with lower 
1 longevity rates). 
l 
I In financial terms about R3.8 billion was the estimated expenditure for all state pensions ! and grants in 1990. and 67 per cent of this went to the pensions for elderly people. Of that 
67 per cent, 33 per cent was allocated to coloured, Indian and white old people, the 
l remainder going to black people in the provinces and in the bantustans (Lund, 1992b). The 
I Disability Grant was allocated about 20 per cent of the total transfer payments to 
I individuals. Le Roux (1991), quoting Department of Health, Welfare and Population 
I Development figures, puts the OAP at about 1.02 per cent of GDP in 1989. 
l 
In March, 1 99 1, there were an estimated 1.1 million OAPs, out of a total population of 
about 32 million people. Between 1983 and 1988, the percentage growth rate in the number 
of pensioners per annum was 7.7, 2.8, and 4.2 per cent for black, coloured and Indian 
people respectively, and 0. l per cent for white people (Smith, 1989: 18). 
The number of white OAPs is dropping gradually. as more and more white people have come 
to make private provision for their retirement; the number of black people coming on to the 
system is increasing. The system has become better known, and mobile pay points go 
further out into rural areas (KwaZulu, for example, had about 1000 mobile and fured pay 
points in 1990); also, the life expectancy of black South Africans has increased, and more 
survive to the age when they can come on to the system, though this is happening 
gradually.3 
What is received by the pensioners themselves, and how does it compare with other sources 
of income? In May 1992, the monthly pension amounts were R345 for whites, R318 for 
coloured and Indian people, and R293 for black people. A decade earlier, the 1982 ratio for 
amounts paid was 10: 5: 1 with whites receiving the highest amount, and black people the 
least. In the last ten years there has been a move towards parity, which now exists for two 
of the smaller pensions (the War Veterans and the Blind Persons Pension). Parity for the 
others has been promised in the 1993 budget. What these figures mean relative to other 
sources of income in rural households will be dealt with after the next section. 
Major Problems with the Present System 
Though the primary purpose of the paper is to draw attention to the potential of the social 
security system, this cannot be done before drawing attention to its problems. These give an 
insight into the power relationships that presently dominate South African society. They 
show how deep and incisive, institutionally, the worth of citizens has been racially carved 
out in terms of rands and cents. The problems also illuminate barriers and constraints to 
getting not only social security but other government services out to the periphery; they 
indicate the extent of the problems of delivery that presently exist. 
The problems can be grouped into those which are a result of discriminatory policies, those 
which are the result of inefficiencies within the delivery system, and straightforward abuse 
of the system for personal gain. 
Racial Discrimination 
The different amounts paid to pensioners, based on race, have been described. There are 
further discriminatory procedures built in to the implementation and delivery systems. I 
have described these in detail elsewhere, and here just give some examples of how this 
discrimination runs deeply in the administrative system. 
Pensions and grants for coloured, Indian and white people are paid from the date of 
application for the benefit. One of the many discriminatory procedures which have worked 
to the disadvantage of black pensioners has been that pensions are paid only from the date 
of approval of the pension by Head Office, and there can be months between these two 
dates. This has been seen as one way in which administrations have tried to effect savings. 
Pensions to black people have been paid every two months, as  opposed to monthly for 
everyone else. The system is changing to a monthly system now for everyone, which is 
generally preferred by people in towns, where there are post office and bank facilities. Some 
rural black pensioners who have to walk miles to and from the pension payout point have 
in fact preferred the bi-monthly system - they walk half the distance every year, and have 
six chances rather than twelve of getting robbed on the way home. 
Ineffldendes within the System 
The cost, in money and time and effort, .of getting a pension, is often very high for the 
individual pensioner. One way of revealing the difficulties is to describe the barriers which 
may stand between a 60-year-old woman and the pension. This prospective pensioner may 
not know of the system at  all.4 She may know about it, but may not want to apply because 
she does not want to become dependent on the money of the government. However, this 
barrier is disappearing - the pension is increasingly seen as  a right, owed to people by a 
government that has delivered very little else in the form of services to black people. 
She may know of the system, but not know how to apply. She may know of the system 
and how to apply, but cannot afford to do so. Some exchanges which take place which 
may require payment are: to the local headman to vouch for her age; for transport to the 
magistrate's office where application is made; she may have to pay a local tax before she can 
apply, or pay for the identification document that is a prerequisite for getting the pension, 
or in the case of frail and disabled elderly, pay the tip to the person who will act as collector. 
If she does manage to apply, the application may be delayed because there is insufficient or 
conflicting information on the form, which is then returned, or the form may be lost, or a 
less-than-competent clerk may return the form for the wrong reason. Having been through 
all these steps, she may have to wait so long, and spend so much money returning each 
two-month period to see whether it has arrived a t  the payout point, that she gives up hope. 
If she finally succeeds in getting the pension, and if she is one of those whose pension is 
collected by someone else because she is too frail, she will have to present herself from time 
to time for review, so that the clerks can see that she is still alive. If her notice of the review 
goes astray, andlor if she does not present herself within the specified time, her name is 
withdrawn from the list, and application has to start anew. In some administrations, it is 
much more difficult getting back on to the system, having been on it once and removed, 
than it is to get on in the frrst place. 
There is a common belief that some of the delays are intentional on behalf of the 
administrations, as  a way of saving money. One delaying mechanism is suspected to 
surround the specifying of the age of applicants. Many older people, especially in rural 
areas, do not know their age. Ingenious systems have been devised in some areas as date 
indicators: for example, the Great War, the German War, the year the woman killed her 
daughter, the time the "boere" came to power (1948 - "boere" being a derogatory term for all 
white people, but especially government supporters), the time they sprayed with DDT, the 
year the locusts came. 
Notwithstanding these attempts to assist people with identifying their age, it is the case 
that very often people's ages are grossly under-estimated by the registering clerk, and this is 
perceived by communities a s  one way the government manages to avoid paying out so 
much in pension money. 
Overt Abuse and Corruption for Personal Gain 
Any system which is as  porous as this holds possibilities for corruption for personal gain. 
.This can be by people within the delivery system, by the pensioners themselves, and by 
interest groups in the environment of the pensioners which help give them access to the 
system. 
On the side of those working for the system, well-known examples are of pension money 
going to buy cars for the civil servants at senior level; clerks taking advantage of the lack of 
literacy and numeracy of the pensioners at the payout point, and handing over only part of 
the money; vans which deliver the money being robbed at gun point; pensioners having to 
pay middlemen in the tribal authorities in order to get access to the system. 
As far a s  cheating the system by beneficiaries is concerned, the poor information systems, 
and the duplication of bureaucracies delivering the system, create porosity as  well. It is 
possible for the same person, using the same name, but with different identity documents, 
to apply for pensions to two adjacent administrations, for example, QwaQwa and the 
Orange Free State Provincial Administration, or Venda and the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration. It is possible for one person to apply to the same administration twice over, 
using two different names. It has been possible for relatives or pensions clerks to keep on 
drawing the pensions or grants of dead people. 
Given that the system is so difficult to access for even one pension, it must surely be the 
case that the abuse by pensioners themselves is infinitesimal compared to abuse from 
within the system. The general point to be made here is that abuse of some sort is inevitable 
given the insinuation of so much cash into such a situation of poverty, in a society where 
violence is becoming endemic. It is a population where the standard of formal education is 
low, both among the beneficiaries and the government personnel, there are poor information 
systems, and poor infrastructural networks for delivery. The organs of the state enjoy 
almost no legitimacy; people feel historically cheated by "the system", and there is no recent 
tradition of civic responsibility upon which to base calls for accountability and reform. 
Positive Features of the Social Secuntty System 
If one views the social security system as a product of apartheid, one is struck by the racial 
discrimination in it, the way it has shored up white advantage, and the way that other 
South Africans have begrudgingly been brought in over the years. If we view the same 
system with other eyes, for example through the eyes of residents in the countries 
surrounding South Africa, the picture looks different. The discriminatory aspects recede, 
and what is foregrounded is the extensiveness of the system, in a comparative southern 
African context. 
Kaseke, for example, describes Zimbabwe's history of social security. In Smith's Rhodesia. 
old- age pensions were only available for white people, using the same rationale as did white 
South Africa for limiting the coverage of the system: 
Africans (were) excluded on the erroneous assumption that upon reaching old age 
they would fall back on the peasant economy for support. (Kaseke. 1988: 9) 
On achieving liberation, the new government could not continue with a system which was 
demonstrably racist, but neither could it extend the pension to all Zimbabweans because 
this was felt to be too expensive. Today, older Zimbabweans who are in need apply for 
assistance under the public assistance programme, which is largely urban-based, and far 
from adequate. 
The regional comparison does not provide a reason for detracting from the injustices in the 
present system - indeed, it strengthens the argument for immediate parity. It does, though, 
provide the impetus to probe with a different eye its existing positive features, and its 
potential for improvement. 
In the rest of this paper, I will deal with the following aspects of the pensions in terms of 
their role in the domestic economy: the amount paid, their use as a household asset, their 
reliability, their targeting of women in general and the poor. I will then consider their role in 
securing security and food security, and consider whether an argument can be made for, if 
not a developmental, then at  least not an anti-development role for pensions as an 
instrument of social policy. 
The Amount of the Pension 
How much is the OAP "worth" to the individual? In urban areas, it is not an adequate 
benefit for anyone, regardless of race, in terms of securing a decent level of living. The R300 
black OAP is about half of a very average black urban wage, and about the same amount as 
a living-in domestic worker would get.5 In rural areas, the amount has a different meaning. 
It is at least twice, and probably closer to three times as high as the rural per capita income. 
It is notoriously diff~cult, however, to get accurate rural per capita income figures, and until 
we can be more confident of the data, we must look to other ways of assessing the 
significance of the pension. 
The receipt of the pension is very often the first or at least the most important source of 
income the elderly will have had (Ardington 1988). The case studies of rural income and 
expenditure patterns reported on at the Carnegie Conference on Poverty showed that 
pensions were the second most important source of income after migrant remittances, or 
after local wages and remittances (Wilson and Ramphele, 1989 passim); these results have 
been confirmed in the work done by Julian May (1990). 
The Pension as a Household Asset 
The second aspect of the economics of the pension is critically important to understand. 
While it is claimed by individuals, it is largely consumed as a household asset in the three- 
generational families in which most black rural pensioners live. Thus many more people 
than the elderly themselves (or the disabled in the case of the Disability Grant) get the 
benefit of the pension. This consumption of the pension by households is unlike that 
pertaining to white South Africans' pension money which all accrues to the pensioners 
themselves when they live on their own. (Pringle, 1984) 
There is unfortunately as yet very little South African research which concentrates on intra- 
household distribution of resources and decision-making about such distribution. However, 
observation of activities at pension payout points provides some evidence. First, alongside 
the queue of pensioners which starts to form early in the morning, come the people running 
the informal sector who set up their "stalls" on blankets on the ground - children's and 
adults' clothes, blankets, fruit, vegetables, paraffi, polish. Trade has started. When the 
pension arrives, one sees the pensioners walk into the store to pay last month's debt for 
consumer goods for the whole household (and rural stores compete with each other to have 
the payout point on or near their premises). The hire-purchase firms have their 
representatives there, waiting to get their slice for the monthly instalment for the household 
furniture (two-monthly debt repayments are allowed - commerce has fitted in with the 
pension dates). The use of the pension for the purchase of general household consumer 
goods is clear. 
The pension contributes to educational expenses. One can observe the grandchild getting 
the money for the school building fund, or for fees, or for whatever other demands the 
school is making on families. Many more children now, compared to ten years ago, have 
access to at least some years of formal schooling. However, of a cohort of one hundred 
children in a typical rural area who start school, about ten will finish the senior years, and 
of those ten, only one will get the matriculation exemption which is the passport to further 
tertiary education. To participate in the education system in rural areas requires regular 
sources of hard cash - and the old-age pension plays its role. 
For years the pension was denied to rural Africans on the grounds that they were part of a 
peasant or subsistence economy in which kinship obligations still held. That economy has 
gone, and the capacity of the pension to "buy care" has become evident. There is no doubt 
that the pension buys the right of the elderly to be cared for by their relatives, but this is the 
focus of another paper (Lund 1992a).G A serious research programme is needed which 
focuses on the contribution of the pension to wealth flows in the household. One can 
anticipate an unusual inter-generational flow of income from the older to the younger 
people, with this being more pronounced the more one moves from cities (where the wage 
comprises a higher part of the household sources of income) to the countryside. With 
increasing unemployment, one can speculate also that the old age pensions bill might be 
increasingly being a stop-gap to cover for the unemployment insurance fund which is 
rapidly becoming bankrupt. Whether the insertion of the pension into rural social and 
economic relations is itself driving a change in the basis of family values is a thoroughly 
fascinating question which requires further exploration. 
The Reliability of the Pension - and a Credit t o  the Household 
A further noteworthy aspect of the pension is its reliability. Despite all the shortcomings 
mentioned above, the pension does, for the majority of the pensioners, get through. The 
reliability is remarked on by pensioners themselves, and by researchers in widely difTering 
regions of the country. For example: 
... for all of Gazankulu in 1982, nine out of every twenty people who receive a steady 
income are pensioners. (Harries. 1984: 8) 
[Around Matatiele and in QwaQwa] a reliable cash income for an individual is one 
primarily obtained from contract employment or from a pension. (Sharp and Spiegel, 
1984) 
[In a coloured township outside Calitzdorp, grants and pensions are] not only ... a 
regular source of income, [they] also compare favourably with the actual earnings of 
workers. A consequence is that it is the disabled and the pensioners who are the 
main breadwinners. (Horner and van Wyk, 1984: 53, 54) (emphases my own) 
Morgan, in his full account of welfare programmes in the SADCC countries surrounding 
South Africa, singles out the importance to poor families of this stability of an income 
source: 
... the problem of vulnerability is related closely to the instability of the various 
sources of income ... within which those deriving from the State ... can play an  
important buffering role. (Morgan, 199 1 : 440) 
This reliability brings with it another advantage to households with pensioners: Ardington 
(1988) shows how the pension is itself often a household source of access to credit. People 
in her Nkandla study spontaneously expressed the view that only pensioners could get 
access to credit at the local store. This was borne out by the fact that 58 per cent of 
households with pensioners had credit, as opposed to 38 per cent of households without. 
Another 11 per cent of households with pensioners said they could have got credit had they 
wanted it. The same study points to the broad coverage of the pensions - more than 50 per 
cent of households had pensioners. It is impossible to generalize this result more broadly. 
however, and comparative empirical evidence is needed for other rural as well as peri-urban 
and urban areas. 
It is Probably Good for Women too 
An increasing number of households of all races in South Africa are headed by women, but 
the trend is particularly high among black rural households. Budlender (1991) has 
estimated that between 18 and 30 per cent of urban black households are female-headed, 
and as many as 60 per cent in some rural areas. A s  women draw the pension earlier, and 
live longer, they should in principle be getting more of it. In this context, the pension has 
the makings of a gender-sensitive benefit. 
Here again, there is as yet a dearth of research about intra-household decision-making 
about incomes and resource allocation in South Africa. The research of Kennedy and Peters 
(19921, based on careful empirical work in Kenya and Malawi, describes the complex 
interaction between income, gender of household head and nutrition, showing that it is not 
the gender of the household head alone which is the determining variable on nutritional 
status. Nevertheless, unless South Africa is completely out of kilter with international 
patterns, the money which goes directly to women is more likely to be spent on beneficial 
goods such as food for children, and education. 
A Proper Meaning for Security? 
To summarize so far: South Africa has a system of social security in place which, without it 
being the intention of the scheme, is in fact getting significant amounts of money, to those 
who need it (black people in households who are poor), to where it is needed (rural areas) on 
a regular (monthly or bi-monthly) basis; it is highly likely that it goes to women 
disproportionately more than it does to men. To this extent, it has in it the elements of 
what so many social policies and programmes try to achieve, but fail to do - it brings the 
security which is the focus of contemporary attention by development theorists. 
In poverty studies in the last decade there has been a move away from the idea of a fxed 
poverty line as a useful tool of analysis. In the first place, income and expenditure in less l 
developed countries are extremely unreliable, if they exist at all. Furthermore, as Burgess ~ 
and Stern ( 199 1 : 48) note: 
~ 
One cannot simultaneously define as the minimum for survival and then 
record how many are surviving below the minimum. 
Another problem is that the focus on a poverty line can divert attention away from the 
distribution below the line, which can be important. Thus the trend has been to an analysis 
of the dynamic understanding of the process of becoming poor and staying poor; away from 
income as a fxed asset towards the ability of vulnerable households to command access to 
a range of resources, particularly food - hence the contemporary prominence of food 
security as a development goal; and towards the stability of sources of income or other 
resources, whatever they are. It would seem that the state pensions in South Africa fit 
remarkably well with criteria which define an effective system of social and economic 
support. It is a significant amount of hard cash, and it is a source of further security. 
The Administrative Advantages of Something that is Already There 
So far the argument has concentrated on the importance to the household of the pension, 
once it gets there. A significant aspect of the scheme, in terms of problems surrounding the 
administration of services in developing countries, is the simple and obvious one - it is 
there. It has a shocking reputation in terms of the abuses and the inconveniences to 
pensioners. But as inadequate as it has been and still is, transport and communications 
infrastructures and procedures are in place which take resources out into the rural areas. 
The only other government services which do the same are the mobile clinics, and to a 
lesser extent the schools. 
The administrative experience, the energy that has gone into devising schemes, the training 
of officials - these are all investments that have already been made. There will surely have 
to be a great deal of re-training and new training (and some retrenchments too), but it will 
not be necessary to break completely new ground. 
The development of better information systems is already under way with computerization, 
and important first moves have been made towards the "harmonization" of the fragmented 
welfare bureaucracies. The point is being reached when flexible delivery systems could be 
considered for the first time. It will be possible to offer beneficiaries in the bantustans the 
choice of monthly or bi-monthly payments (as is already done for black pensioners in two of 
the provinces) depending on their settlement patterns, and the availability of other facilities 
such as banks and post offices. 
Also, other services could be delivered a t  the same time, as Elisabeth Ardington has 
consistently argued. Examples of these, which would make for a more responsive and 
efficient system, are the registration of births and deaths, processing of identification 
documents, provision of educational and advice materials of all sorts. More ambitiously, 
there could be a symbiotic effect of improving one service. Upgrading pension delivery 
provides a justification for the provision of electricity at  or from one point. The provision of 
these services could lead to the incremental arrival of others. If this resulted in the 
presence of a bureaucrat on a more or less permanent basis, this could be the means 
whereby the local community could more readily find out how to get access to a range of 
other government and private services - mobile and fmed clinics, conservation education, 
agricultural extension, and so on. The point is, the very basic infrastructure is already 
there, waiting to be activated. 
It May Offer Security, but is it Development?: the Organizational Potential of the Scheme 
There are new embryonic initiatives which are tantalizing in the potential they show for 
organizing broader development initiatives around the pensions system. Committees set up 
by rural action groups such as  the Transvaal Rural Action Committee have started 
broadening their scope to organize around development issues. A new cadre of workers in 
the para-legal and welfare field are working in the Natal and KwaZulu region, under the 
Community Law Centre, and the Centre for Community Organization, Research and 
Development (CORD). 
In the latter's welfare programme, the workers assist people with getting pensions, grants, 
and other welfare services. In the course of the contact they make the pensioners aware of 
other initiatives taking place in, for example, water provision, chicken production and 
vegetable production. Some of the pensioners have started putting aside a portion of their 
benefits for individual or community income-generating projects. Fiona Wakelin, who 
coordinates this side of CORD'S work, explains in an interview the underlying rationale of 
the work which moves from the provision of pensions to the articulation between local 
communities and the local state around the provision of other resources: 
This programme sees welfare as a dynamic force that can start other factors moving. 
which will improve the social fabric generally. For example through a programme 
such as the Mabheleni Community Shop instead of pensions being viewed as a purely 
welfarist intervention by the state, they become the means of generating further 
income. The pension or grant is used to buy goods from the shop - the net that feeds 
the money back into community structures. The input from the community shop is 
then used to engage the state as well as to provide basic social services, which include 
the salary of the welfare field workers. (Lund and Wakelin, 1992: l l )  
Wakelin describes, too, how the pensions can be a useful point of entry to a community - 
something much needed by new development initiatives: 
One possible thing to go in on is water, because that is a useful point of entry. If you 
can go and get some success stories with some old people who have ... had no one 
out there to support them, it has an impact. Suddenly these people have a social 
worth again. It is amazing what an injection of capital to a household can do to the 
worth of the person who is bringing it in. (Lund and Wakelin, 1992: 13) 
In other parts of the interview, she describes how basic community development principles 
are adhered to in this programme which looks as  though it is to do with encouraging 
dependency and handouts. It responds to felt needs, it brings women centrally into the 
organizing process, it trains local people as advice officers, and gives them skills to get 
resources from the state into local areas, and it challenges repressive local authority 
structures. For all of these reasons, it is also harassed by the authorities. 
Conclusion 
Will this social security system, which is relatively extensive in the southern African 
co~ltext, be allowed to survive'? What will be the internal and the external threats to its 
co~itir~uatio~i,  especially after 1993 when the final rnove to parity will significantly increase 
the proportion of the budget which the pensions bill accounts for'? 
Tlic South African government is under pressure to expand its social spending, a t  a tirne 
wher~ this flies in tlie face of internatiorlal moves towards reduced social spending, and a 
reduc.ed role for the state. It cotlld be argued that the denlands in the competing social 
fields of Iiousing, health and ed~lcation must take precedence over spending on "the 
~ ~ n p r o d ~ ~ c t i v e  aged", and "the unproductive disabled". 
One important safeguard for the continuance of the pensions is the organized lobby which 
exists - inter alia, the Black Sash, the Legal Resources Centres, and the rural action 
corrl~iiittees, who play a key role a s  watclldogs, organizers and brokers. Recent television 
prograninies and all i~ldepe~idently lilade film have also raised tlie general public 
co~lscio~~sliess about the importance of the petlsions (and the chaotic and at times quite 
inh~rnlan delivery system). 
However, far more needs to be understood about the economic role of the pensions, and of 
the social security system a s  a whole, if it is to be protected a s  an active instrument of 
social and eco~ioxilic policy in tlie fields of poverty alleviation andlor redistribution. For 
exaniple, llow do the state pensions articulate, sideways and over time, with other aspects 
of social security such a s  unenlployment insurance, workers' compensation, and other 
occupational benefits'? To what extent does the old-age pension get used also to feed into 
and strexigthen the neighbourhood stokvels which are a vitally important source of 
econo~nic savings and security'? Do these in turn form the basis for seed rxioney for srrlall 
income-generaling projects*? 
Fi~ldirlg the answers to sollie of these questions, and the ones about liousel~old distribution 
~ncntionec-l t l irougho~~t tlie paper. will help us to break out of tlie tedious and ~nisleaditlg 
dradloclced debates about the state or the market, public or private provision, relief or 
clevelopn~ent, the unaffordability of pensions. What is also ~leeded is riiore work like that 
startcd by Loots ( 1992) and Wilsori ( 1990) which can form the basis for the construction of 
co~lcreie proposals for a national insurance scheme for the future. 
One very difficult decision which will face the fixture government, and which genuinely 
introduces notions of affordability, will be about pensions and grants for refi~gees frorn other 
so~~tl iern African countries. Clinlatic cl~anges, changes in international markets, their owl  
internal economic policies, and South Africa's ~rlilitary and security policies have led to the 
i~ i~~~over i s l~~ i i e l i t  of these areas. Morgan's exte~lsive survey of efforts in the SADCC 
co~~nt r i e s  to create welfare program~nes describes the very differing success rates and 
different levels of co~rlnlitinent - Malawi has done allnost nothing, whereas Botswana's 
multi-pronged relief programme is now receiving positive critical attention i~lternationally 
(Morgan. 199 1 ). Be that a s  it Inay, residents of these countries, especially Mozambique, 
have conle and continue to conle to South Africa, and are able to integrate thenlselves 
relatively easily into local areas, and then claim pensions. Five years ago. when state 
repression was arguably a t  its worst, it was poignant to hear the "foreign" elderly refugees 
cite tlie pension systerii a s  one reason for colrling to live under the apartheid regitne. It is 
liighly unlikely that the future goverrltiient will view the social-security system generously 
as  one way of paying reparations; it is Illore likely to introduce far stricter rules about who 
gets access to it. 
I11 the face of such bleak perforlriarlce records, for the poor, of both ~nacro-level structural 
adjustment programmes, and liliddle and micro-level development projects and pro@axi~mes, 
I tliirik there is a place for a defence of a sriiall systelil (in macro-economic terms) which gets 
llard cash o11t to where it is nlost needed, and where there is beginning to be evidence of its 
~wte~itial for broader development initiatives. The bottom-line of the argument. I suppose. is 
that this well-targeted econoniic lifeline should be assertively protected and defended over 
this tillie of transition, until there is fir111 evidence that the nlajor political and economic 
actors art= able to come up with something a s  effective, a s  redistributive, and a s  cheap. 
NOTES 
1 The residual system is a t  the other end of a conceptual spectrum from an 
institutional system, which is characterized by welfare benefits being a part of the 
bundle of rights of citizenship - the state "owes" the individual more. Welfare states 
such as Sweden and the United Kingdom (a few years ago) would be described as 
approaching the institutional end of the spectrum. 
2 This paper does not include a consideration of the civil pensions' system for 
employees of the state, nor does it include occupationally-related benefits coming 
from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (which includes maternity benefits), or the 
Workmen's (sic) Compensation Act. It does not include private social-security 
systems, from the massive insurance industry like Sanlam, to the smaller 
Benevolent and Friendly Societies. Finally, it does not cover the informal 
neighbourhood savings and exchange schemes which are very active in mostly black 
r esidential areas. 
3 The House of Representatives, through which welfare for coloured people is 
delivered, estimates that 9 per cent of the total coloured population is in receipt of a 
grant of some sort. 
l 4 This is becoming increasingly rare with respect to the OAP; it applies to less well- 
known grants such as the Maintenance Grant especially in the bantustans, where 
some Grits have fallen away entirely. 
5 The relevance, in a context of such low wages and high unemployment, of the 
concept of "income replacement" in connection with social-security benefits needs to 
be explored here. 
6 I argue explicitly there that the pension has the potential to solve one of the 
emerging problems of social policy in developing countries - how to care for the 
ageing population. Midgley (1984: 197) calls for mechanisms which protect and 
strengthen existing traditional practices of caring. In discussing innovations to 
social security systems in third world countries, he says: 
One possibility is to strengthen the extended family's responsibilities 
through the payment of monetary allowances to poor families who fulfil their 
obliga%ons to needy relatives. - 
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